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AbStrACt. the principal-agent problem arising from asymmetric information in presales of 
uncompleted properties in forward property markets has been well-recognized. since buyers are 
not able to inspect the uncompleted properties when they make the purchases, developers may 
hide information about the negative aspects of the properties or over-state the quality in order 
to generate an extra profit in the presales on top of the equilibrium value as if the properties 
were sold in the spot market. In this regard, the study adapted a forward-spot property repeat 
sales pricing model to explore the pricing of presale properties compared to that of spot proper-
ties in which the principal-agent problem does not exist. The findings suggest that developers 
were able to impose a wealth transfer from the buyers in pricing presale properties taking the 
advantage of asymmetric information embedded in forward property markets.
keYwordS: forward property market; Presale properties; Asymmetric information; wealth 
transfer; repeat sales method
1. INtrodUCtIoN
Presales of uncompleted properties have 
been popularly used by developers to finance 
the upfront capital of large-scale developments 
such as high-rise apartments, condominiums 
and large housing estates, in particular, in big 
cities like hong kong, singapore, toronto and 
London (chang and ward, 1993; chau et al., 
2003; Leung et al., 2007a; tribune, 2005). 
however, asymmetric information exists in 
forward property markets because of the 
principal-agent problem between developers 
and presale property buyers. once a forward 
contract is executed, the buyer becomes the 
principal of the uncompleted property and has 
to rely on the developer, i.e. the agent, to fin-
ish the construction work in accordance with 
the terms stated in the forward contract. but 
this principal-agent relationship, in which the 
developer possesses more information than the 
buyer in regard to the construction work, has 
created a moral hazard problem for the buyer 
(chau et al., 2003; min, 1997). due to the lack 
of knowledge and technical expertise, the buy-
er cannot be sure whether his best interests 
are served by the developer and whether the 
quality of the work will be up-kept after the 
developer has collected the proceeds (Leung 
et al., 2007a). 
It has been evidenced that presale property 
buyers are exposed to a group of hidden risks 
arising from asymmetric information. for ex-
ample, development defaults in the middle of 
the construction after the presale proceeds had 
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been collected were commonly found in both 
mainland china and malaysia (Esha, 2003; 
Property times, 2006; Yang, 2001). According 
to the record of Liaison Office of China, up to 
june 2004, there were 240 defaulted property 
sites left unresolved just in Guangtung Prov-
ince (kalifa, 2005). some of the housing estates 
were even repeatedly sold or mortgaged due 
to the absence of proper regulations (Leung 
et al., 2009). In malaysia, the government was 
working hard to revive 97 abandoned housing 
schemes just in 2004 (the star, 2004). besides 
defaults, the problems of “housing scam”, late 
completion and building defects were also se-
vere in malaysia (Property times, 2006). 
Although housing default is not serious in 
hong kong, other problems are found, for ex-
ample, quality of uncompleted properties be-
ing overstated in presale promotions and ex-
aggeration of presale floor areas (Leung et al., 
2007a). developers tried to disguise the size 
of the floor areas in the show-flats in presale 
promotions by using magnifier glass for the fit-
tings, making all furniture into smaller size 
to make the room look proportional, convert-
ing the bay-window as part of sleeping place 
so that a standard-size bed could be fitted in, 
and/or setting the height of the sample flat 
higher than the actual to make the room look 
spacious (daily Apple, 2006a). furthermore, 
the building quality promised in the presale 
promotions cannot be guaranteed. A renowned 
property inspector witnessed that many buy-
ers cried out when they found the quality of 
the properties that they bought through pre-
sales turned out to be so poor. they included 
uneven flooring and poor plastering, window 
with more than 50 cracks, curved wall panel-
ing, wooden floor panel creating cracky noises, 
and water leaking in the bathroom (Next mag-
azine, 2004). 
Unethical tactics have also been used by 
some unscrupulous developers in presale 
promotions in order to boost up the prices 
and the presales volume (Leung et al., 2009). 
for example, no price list was offered in the 
presales and the information was selectively 
released by sales agents, and there were no 
records found in the registry on some presale 
transactions released by developers. As a re-
sult, without getting hold of full information 
of the presale properties, some buyers found 
that they had paid a price much higher than 
that of similar units ranging from 11.89% to as 
high as 15.11% (Apple daily, 2006b). despite 
the regulatory measures taken by the govern-
ment, a survey conducted by the Political & 
Economic risk consultancy Ltd. (PErc, 2005) 
reviewed that the forward property market in 
hong kong “has long suffered from poor trans-
parency”. As the number of complaints about 
inadequate and misleading presales informa-
tion grew, there were increasing calls in the 
Legislative council for measures to address 
the problems (Lc, 2004 and 2006). similar 
problems have also been found in other coun-
tries like taiwan, canada and the U.k. (Li, 
1998; scc, 2006).
In fact, there has been a saying in the prop-
erty market that developers might be able to 
earn an extra profit from the presale proper-
ties higher than the equilibrium market price 
as if they were sold in the spot market tak-
ing the advantage of the asymmetric informa-
tion (scmP, 2005; Lai, 2006), in particular, 
when the demand of properties was high in 
the market. on the other side, buyers might 
have accepted the extra cost imposed on the 
presales in order to get the developments with 
the attributes they desired (Yang, 2001). the 
study, therefore, was conducted to investigate 
empirically whether an extra profit, on top of 
the equilibrium prices of the properties, has 
been imposed by developers in pricing presale 
properties taking the advantage of the asym-
metric information.
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2. LIterAtUre reVIew
A number of studies have been conducted 
to investigate the moral hazard problem aris-
ing from asymmetric information inherent in 
various forward markets. Akerlof (1970) pro-
posed that if asymmetric information exists 
and thus the provision of ‘Lemons’ is possible 
in the market, bad products will drive out good 
products and no market can exit. only with 
the use of guarantees and licensing through 
government intervention to control the prod-
uct quality, then the market can work. this 
happens in property presales markets in many 
countries which have taken both administra-
tive policies and self-regulatory measures to 
control the quality of presale properties and 
mitigate the negative impacts arising from the 
asymmetric information. these measures are 
able to maintain the presale markets with the 
provision of “average goods” (Akerlof, 1970), 
but it seems they are not able to ensure that 
the features of the units upon completion are 
as “good” as what have been promised by the 
developers. In a series of studies conducted by 
ong and Gwin on building defects, warranties 
and project financing on presale properties 
(ong, 1997 and 1999; Gwin and ong, 2000), 
they found that builders made little effort in 
the construction after the proceeds had been 
collected. this resulted in more building de-
fects on presale properties upon completion 
compared to those sold in the spot market. 
Yang (2001) found that poorly-built properties 
derived not only from the use of substandard 
building materials but also from mismatch 
between the decoration and what had been 
promised in presale promotions (Yang, 2001). 
Leung et al. (2007b) studied the impact of the 
hidden presale risks arising from asymmetric 
information on the pricing of presale proper-
ties. They found that an extra profit had been 
imposed by developers on presale property 
prices in the forward property market in which 
asymmetric information was embedded.
following the findings of Leung et al. 
(2007b), further investigation has been con-
ducted to study how the asymmetric informa-
tion can help generate an extra profit trans-
ferred from presale property buyers to devel-
opers. According to Leland and Pyle (1977), 
asymmetric information undermines the di-
rect transfer of information between market 
players and, therefore, whoever possesses the 
information is thus able to generate substan-
tial rewards from exaggerating the positive 
qualities of the products. Gardner (2003) also 
pointed out that if the information is biased 
towards some players, the deal will be unfair 
to those who do not possess the information. 
farrell (2003) investigated the principal-agen-
cy risk in project finance. The study proposed 
that developers, i.e. the agents, are able to 
transfer wealth from the unwary principals of 
the project to themselves through the use of 
actions which are unobservable by the princi-
pals. weimer and Vining (2005) showed that 
when there are situations where the amount 
of information about the characteristics of a 
good varies between the buyer and the seller, 
then inefficiency in the trade of that good oc-
curs due to the asymmetric information, and 
transfer of an additional wealth may happen.
the wealth transfer from buyers to develop-
ers on a property presale can be explained by 
the economic theory of transfer of consumer 
surplus with asymmetric information (weimer 
and Vining, 2005). In figure 1, dU represents 
the quantities of the good that a consumer 
would buy at various prices in the absence 
of full information about its quality, i.e. with 
asymmetric information, and it is known as 
the consumer’s uninformed demand schedule. 
dI represents the amounts of the good that 
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would be purchased at various prices if the 
consumer possessed full information about its 
quality, and this is known as the consumer’s 
informed demand schedule. 
the quantity purchased by the uninformed 
consumer is determined by the intersection of 
dU with the supply schedule, s. this amount, 
QU, is greater than QI, the amount at which 
the consumer would have purchased if fully 
informed about the quality of the good. the 
darkly shaded area abc equals the deadweight 
loss in consumer surplus resulting from the 
over-consumption. that is, for each unit pur-
chased beyond QI, the consumer pays more 
than its marginal value as measured by the 
height of the informed demand schedule. this 
excess consumption also results in a higher 
equilibrium price, PU, which transfers surplus 
(wealth) equal to the area PUbaPI from con-
sumers to producers of the good. weimer and 
Vining (2005) also stated that it is an incen-
tive for producers to hide information about 
the true quality of the good from buyers. when 
producers hide the information about the 
negative aspects of the good, consumers may 
over-estimate the quality, and this will maxi-
mize the difference between PU and PI, so the 
wealth will be transferred from the buyers to 
the producers.
It is suggested in forward property markets 
that developers might have charged a price 
(PU) on the housing attributes higher than 
the expected market price at equilibrium (PI) 
by the time they offered the presales taking 
advantage of the asymmetric information (Lai, 
2006; scmP, 2005). on the other side, buyers 
might have to accept the higher price imposed 
on presales in order to get the developments 
with the housing attributes that they desired, 
which resulted in an additional wealth trans-
fer from PU and PI .
Figure 1. transfer of wealth with asymmetric information
















 QU = Uninformed consumption        
QI = Informed consumption           
abc = Deadweight loss if uninformed    
PUbaPI  = Extra producer rent if uninformed  
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3. reSeArCh methodoLogY
Among the limited research studying pre-
sale properties, shiller (1993) proposed the use 
of a hedonic repeated sales method (rsm) to 
estimate the property values traded in forward 
markets. Lai et al. (2004) modeled a property 
presale decision in a real-option framework 
and suggested that developers achieve risk-
sharing purpose by selling their projects be-
fore their completion dates. chang and ward 
(1993) priced presale properties in taiwan as 
a forward asset with carrying charge. chau 
et al. (2003) set up a price discovery function 
by the use of the forward contract repeat 
sales (fcrs) method for constructing a for-
ward property price index in hong kong. how-
ever, none of these researches has accounted 
for the hidden presale risks contained in the 
forward property market. choy et al. (2006) 
used a pooled cross-sectional analysis to study 
the mispricing between presale and spot prop-
erties. However, the findings are limited to the 
pricing of the few selected housing attributes 
like view and size of the presale properties 
without considering the impacts of the other 
hidden presale risks.
3.1. Conceptual framework  
for pricing properties
Leung et al. (2007b) developed a forward-
spot tracking index (fsIt) model for measuring 
the extra profit imposed by developers on pric-
ing presale properties in the forward market 
in which the hidden presale risks were found. 
According to the conceptual framework of the 
fsIt, the equilibrium prices of spot properties 
is a function of a list of internal and external 
factors as shown in figure 2. the internal fac-
tors include the costs of producing the hous-
ing attributes and the age of the property. the 
external factors reflected in the market return 
include the aspects of the demand for housing, 
the economic sentiment, the choice of product 
attributes made available by competitors and 
other market factors. regarding presale prop-
erties, the pricing takes into consideration 
not only the internal and the external factors, 
the same as for spot properties, but also the 
additional expected and unexpected presale 
risks which are specific to the forward market 
as shown on the right-hand side of figure 2. 
 
Internal factors: 
- Provision of housing attributes  
- Age of the spot property 
 
External factor: 
- Market required rate of return 
 
Spot property  pricing  
Presale risks during the 
construction time-lag: 
- Market uncertainty 
- Capital finance risk 
- Hidden presale risks 
     
    Presale property pricing 
Figure 2. conceptual framework for pricing spot and presale properties
source: Leung et al. (2007b)
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the additional risks include the expected pre-
sale risks arising from market uncertainty 
during the construction time-lag, the risk from 
interest rate fluctuations on the additional 
capital financed for the purchase within the 
forward contract period, and also the hidden 
presale risks arising from asymmetric infor-
mation inherent in the market which include, 
for example, the risks of development default, 
high building defect risk, housing features mis-
match, exaggeration of floor areas and the use 
of unethical presale tactics (Leung et al., 2007a 
and 2009).
3.2. the repeat Sales method  
and the improved FSIt
based on the framework outlined in figure 
2, the repeat sales method (rsm) developed 
by shiller (1993) was employed by Leung et al. 
(2007b) for building the fsIt. According to 
the rsm, the quality of a property possesses 
a package of attributes, ,x  which remain un-
changed between times. Under this assump-
tion, all properties have the same price path 
through time and a change in the price level 
of a property occurs only in response to the 
change in price of the same property sold to in-
dicate the market return, ,m  required between 
the two sales period. As such, this method 
has the advantage of avoiding the functional 
form required for measuring the unique hous-
ing attributes of the properties ( )p x  as they 
have been cancelled out in the repeat sales. 
It should be noted that the assumption of no 
quality change of the property between sales 
holds only if the aging effect, ,a  has been con-
sidered. As such, the price change between the 
two sales of the same property under the rsm 
can be written as, 
2 1
( , ,)t tP P P m a− =  (1)
where: 
1tP  = price of the first sale of the proper-
ty sold at 1;t  2tP  = price of the subsequent sale 
of the same property sold at 2;t  m = market 
return of the property during the holding pe-
riod from 1t  to 2;t  a  = aging effect incurred 
on the property during the holding period from 
1t  to 2.t
Applying the repeat sales equation (1) into 
presale properties, if the same properties have 
their first sales taken place in the forward mar-
ket in form of presales with the assumption of 
the presale risks, ;FP  whereas the subsequent 
sales are transacted in the spot market after 
their completion, ;SP  then equation (1) could 
be revised as,
( , , , )S FP P P m r a h− = τ  (2)
where: FP  = price of the first (pre)sale of the 
uncompleted property; SP  = price of the sub-
sequent (spot)sale of the same property after 
completion; m = market return generated dur-
ing the holding period between time F and ;S  
a  = aging effect from completion of the prop-
erty to its subsequent (spot)sale; r  = net com-
pounded discount rate required in the market; 
τ  = construction time-lag between the presale 
and the completion of the property; rτ  = total 
discount to compensate the additional cost of 
capital in form of payment discount during ;τ  
h  = hidden presale risks borne by buyers dur-
ing the construction time-lag.
Instead of using the fsIt developed by Le-
ung et al. (2007b) which adopted a log-linear 
structure, an improved testable format was 
built in this research using a semi-log struc-
ture for investigating the impacts of the pre-
sale risks contained in equation (2), shown as,
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 01 2( , ) 3 4 5ln ln lnSt Ft F S t t t t t t t tP P m r a h− − − −→ → → →− = β + β + β τ + β + β + ε
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 01 2( , ) 3 4 5ln ln lnSt F F S t t t t t t t tP P m r a h− − − −→ → → →− = β + β + β τ + β + β + ε  (3)
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 01 2( , ) 3 4 5ln( / ) lnSt Ft F S t t t t t t t tP P m r a h− − − −→ → → →= β + β + β τ + β + β + ε
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 01 2( , ) 3 4 5ln( / ) lnSt Ft F S t t t t t t t tP P m r a h− − − −→ → → →= β + β + β τ + β + β + ε  (4)
where: 
1 1
ln( / )St FtP P − = logarithm of the relative 
price changes of the forward-spot pair sales; 
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1β = intercept coefficient (constant); 1 1ln t tm − →  
= logarithm of the market returns generated 
from the spot property index prevailed in the 
property market during the holding periods 
from 1t−  to 1;t  2( , )F Sβ  = coefficient measuring 
the relationship between the rates of returns 
generated from the presales and those gener-
ated from the spot properties; 
1 0t tr − →τ  = dis-
counts required to compensate the additional 
cost of capital during the construction time-lag 
from 1t−  to 0 ;t  3β  = coefficient attached to the 
discount factor; 
0 1t ta →  = aging effect from com-
pletion of the property, 0 ,t  to its subsequent 
sale in the spot market, 1;t  4β = coefficient 
attached to aging effect; 
1 0t th − →  = hidden pre-
sale risks borne by buyers during construction 
time-lag, 1t−  to 0 ;t  5β = coefficient attached to 
the hidden presale risks; ε  = error term.
Equation (4) can capture both the expected 
and the hidden presale risks contained in fig-
ure 2, namely the return generated to cover 
the market risk during the construction time-
lag, ;m  the discount to compensate for the 
additional cost of capital incurred to presale 
property buyers within the forward contract 
period, ;rτ  and the possible wealth transfer 
imposed by developers on the presales taking 
the advantage of the bundle of hidden presale 
risks arising from asymmetric information in-
herent in the forward property market.
Index tracking of the price changes of 
presale properties – if the presale proper-
ties during the forward contract period possess 
the same level of market risk borne by spot 
properties, the returns required from the re-
peat sales of the presale properties and that 
of spot properties should then be similar and, 
as such, their price indices should track along 
closely with each other. therefore, the correla-
tion coefficient, 2 ,β  measuring the elasticity of 
the two streams of return rates was expected 
to be close to 1. Any deviation between the two 
price indices, forward and spot, would suggest 
otherwise.
It should be noted that in the original fsIt 
model developed by Leung et al. (2007b), a log-
linear format was used to compare the pricing 
behaviors between presales and spot-sales of 
the same set of properties during the study 
period. however, if a log-linear structure was 
used to define the relationship between the 
price difference of the presales and spot-sales, 
the continuous compounding returns of the 
price difference of the presales presented in 
logarithm would be smaller than the discrete 
returns of the price difference of the spot-sales 
presented in linear structure. As such, the co-
efficient measuring the relationship between 
the two, 2 ,β  could hardly be close to 1 as ex-
pected.
to improve the performance of the fsIt 
model, logarithm on both the price difference 
of the presales and the price difference of the 
spot-sales should be taken. by doing so, the 
coefficient measuring the relationship between 
the price difference of the presales and that of 
spot-sales, 2 ,β  would then be close to 1 since 
logarithm has been taken on both the depend-
ent and independent variables. to verify this, 
an improved fsIt model was built as shown 
in equation (4).
discounts required to compensate the 
additional cost of capital – the discount 
required by the buyer was regarded as the 
compensation for the additional cost of capital 
for holding the uncompleted property during 
the construction time-lag in which no rental 
income can be generated. The coefficient 3β  
was expected to be positive, i.e. the higher the 
interest rate and the longer the construction 
time-lag, the more was the discount required 
in the presales and thus the larger the relative 
price changes between the pair-sales (chau 
et al., 2003). 
depreciation due to aging of the prop-
erties – if subsequent sales of the properties 
are transacted some time after the completion 
at 1,t  then adjustment had to be made to con-
trol the aging impact of the spot properties 
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transacted in the subsequent sales in order to 
keep the price level free from the change in 
quality over time. A negative sign on 4β was 
expected to show the depreciation taken place 
on the properties.
wealth transfer arising from asym-
metric information and the three repeat 
sales method – since there was hardly any 
proxy available in the market for identifying 
the group of hidden presale risks arising from 
asymmetric information in one measure, a 
dummy variable, ,h  was built into the model 
to investigate whether there was any impact 
from the hidden risks imposed on the pricing 
of the presale properties. the dummy varia-
ble, ,h  was used to classify the category of the 
forward-spot pair-sales from the spot-spot pair 
sales of the same set of properties contained 
in the sample set for comparison. however, 
only forward-spot pair-sales were contained in 
Equation 2 without the inclusion of spot-spot 
pair-sales. to tackle this problem, spot-spot 
pair-sales of the properties had to be included 
in the model for the analysis. As such, three 
repeat sales of the same property with the first 
sale 
1
( )FtP −  transacted in the forward market 
and the subsequent two sales 
1
( StP for the sec-
ond sale and 
2StP  for the third sale) transacted 
in the spot market were required in order to 
make two-pairs-sales for the same property, 
i.e. a forward-spot pair, 
1 1
ln( / ),St FtP P −  and 
a spot-spot pair, 
2 1
ln( / ),St StP P  for the same 
property. Equation 4 was then revised as,
2 1 1 2 3 4 5ln( / ) lnP P m r a h= β + β + β τ + β + β + ε
2 1 1 2 3 4 5ln( / ) lnP P m r a h= β + β + β τ + β + β + ε  (5)
where: 2 1ln( / )P P = logarithm of the relative 
price changes of the two sets of repeat sales 
data from the same properties. 
1 1
ln( / )St FtP P − if 
they were forward-spot pairs, and 
2 1
ln( / )St StP P  
if they were spot-spot pairs; lnm  = logarithm 
of the market returns generated from the 
spot index, the period is from 1t−  to 1t  if the 
dependant variable was a forward-spot pair, 
and from 1t  to 2t  if the dependant variable 
was a spot-spot pair; rτ  = payment discounts 
to compensate the additional cost of capital 
from 1−t  to 0t  for forward-spot pairs and zero 
otherwise; a  = aging effect on forward-spot 
pairs from 0t to 1,t  and spot-spot pairs from 
1t to 2;t  h = unity was assigned if they were 
forward-spot pairs and zero otherwise.
If the coefficient 5β  attached to the dummy 
variable had significantly lowered the inter-
cept (in negative sign), the differential inter-
cept suggested that a wealth transfer relative 
to the price changes had been embedded in 
pricing the presale properties. the larger the 
negative differential intercept, the higher the 
presale properties were priced at 1t− compared 
to their equilibrium spot prices.
3.3. data source
the study period covered the years from 
1993 to 2006 and the data were extracted from 
various sources for the validation. 
properties chosen – properties contained 
in the sample set were selected from twelve 
randomly selected housing estates. they were 
all high-rise buildings in the form of self-con-
tained housing estates in which their structur-
al characteristics, neighborhoods and ameni-
ties were very similar (tse, 1997). As required 
by the fsIt, only properties with three repeat 
sales were selected so that a forward-spot pair 
and a spot-spot pair could be formed for the 
same individual property. there were a total 
of 2136 pair-sales, including both the forward-
spot pairs and spot-spot pairs, extracted from 
the years 1993 to 2006 from the Economic and 
Property research centre (EPrc). the trans-
actions spread evenly over the study period so 
that both boom and bust periods were covered 
in the tests. to further control the quality of the 
sample set, the ages of the properties selected 
for the study were no more than ten years old 
when the spot sales were transacted. 
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Spot property price index – the select-
ed Popular residential developments (sPrd) 
published by the rating and Valuation de-
partment of the hong kong Government was 
considered the most appropriate benchmark 
proxy in this study for measuring the returns 
generated in the spot property market. It is 
because the sPrd covers properties from 
large self-contained estates which share simi-
lar characteristics with the twelve housing es-
tates chosen for the study in terms of period 
of construction, building style, facilities and 
properties attributes. Also, the data are avail-
able on quarterly basis which provides more 
up-to-date information in reflecting the recent 
market sentiment and has been the primary 
source that practitioners make reference to. 
the sPrd price index was, therefore, used as 
the benchmark proxy for measuring returns 
generated from the spot property market.
discounts to compensate for the addi-
tional cost of capital – most property devel-
opments are financed through borrowing and 
the borrowing rates charged by banks in hong 
Kong generally fluctuate with the best lend-
ing rates. developers would take reference of 
the best lending rates for setting the discounts 
table 1. summary statistics of the twelve housing estates
Variables min. max. mean std. deviation
sales price1 0.6 17.5 4.5 2.5
relative price changes2 0.2094 3.4667 1.0119 0.4394
spot market returns3 –122.3 95.9 –8.4 50.1
Age4 0 10 3.5 2.8
Annual discount rate5 5 11 9 1
construction time-lag6 0 1.9 0.4 0.4
total compounded discounts required7 0 17.2 2.8 3.6
No. of pair sales (N) 2136
1 All sales prices, including both presales and spot-sales, under the dependant variable (in million hk dollars); 
2 relative price changes of the pair-sales under the dependant variable (P2 / P1); 3 returns generated from the property 
market measured by the sPrd (spot property) Index during the holding periods (in %); 4 Ages of the properties when 
the spot sales were conducted (in years); 5 Annual discount rates required in the market (in %); 6 construction time-
lags during the forward contract period (in years); 7 total payment discounts required to compensate the additional 
cost of capital during the construction time-lag (in %).
offered. the best lending rates, extracted from 
the database of the hong kong monetary Au-
thority, therefore, was used in this study as 
proxy for measuring the cost of capital.
A summary statistics of the sample set is 
contained in table 1.
4. reSeArCh FINdINgS
ordinary Least square (oLs) method was 
used for the validation of the models built in 
the study.
4.1. oLS estimation of the improved 
FSIt model 
table 2 contains the results generated 
from the validation of the improved fsIt. 
The signs of all the coefficients attached to 
the explanatory variables were generated as 
expected. The coefficient, 2 ,β  measuring the 
elasticity of the percentage change in the 
price difference of the forward-spot proper-
ties for a percentage change of the price dif-
ference of the benchmark spot properties, 
was at 0.9903. It was not only significant 
with t-stat at 86.05 but also very close to 1. 
Wealth Transfer in Forward Property Markets 267
It indicated that the relative price changes of 
both the forward property market and the spot 
market during the study period were not only 
in the same direction but also with a high de-
gree of synchronization which was close to 1. 
The discount factor showed a positive coeffi-
cient of 0.9625 which indicated that a discount 
very close to the estimated compensation was 
embedded in the presale prices as payment dis-
count for covering the additional cost of capital 
incurred to the buyers during the construction 
time-lag. the aging factor showed a negative 
coefficient of –0.0158 which was approximated 
at a depreciation rate of 1.6% per annum in 
depreciation of property values. the negative 
coefficient of –0.04 attached to the hidden pre-
sale risks suggested that a wealth transfer was 
found only in the price changes of forward-spot 
pair-sales, but not in the spot-spot pair-sales of 
the same properties. It was also statistically 
significant at t-stat of –2.79. The finding sup-
ports the proposition that developers were able 
to charge an extra profit of approximately 4% 
on the presale property prices higher than the 
expected prices of the same set of properties 
sold in the spot market in which no hidden 
presale risks were present.
table 2. oLs estimates of the improved fsIt on the housing estates
Explanatory variables Coefficient std. Error t-stat Prob.
constant 1β
0.0162 0.0103 1.59 0.1146
spot market returns 2β
0.9903 0.0115 86.05 0.0000
discount factor 3β
0.9625 0.1888 5.10 0.0000
Aging 4β
–0.0158 0.0018 –3.20 0.0014
hidden presale risk 5β
–0.0405 0.0146 –2.79 0.0054
Adjusted r-squared 0.84
f-stat 2866
No. of pair sales (N) 2136
4.2. oLS estimation on presale 
properties only
the improved fsIt model was used to com-
pare the pricing behaviors between presales 
(forward-spot pair-sales) and spot-sales (spot-
spot pair-sales) of the same set of properties 
and the results showed that a wealth transfer 
was embedded in the presales but not in the 
spot sales. then, one might ask how presale 
properties would perform on their own in the 
forward property market without inclusion of 
the spot properties. to do this, a separate test 
was needed which contained only forward-spot 
pair sales without the spot-spot pair sales. 
based on the improved fsIt, the dummy vari-
able representing the hidden presale risks was 
excluded from the test so that the spot-spot 
pair sales were taken out from the dependant 
variable set, equation (5) was revised as,
1 1 1 2 3 4ln( / ) lnSt FtP P m r a− = γ + γ + γ τ + γ + ε
1 1 1 2 3 4ln( / ) lnSt FtP P m r a− = γ + γ + γ τ + γ + ε  (6)
since the dummy variable was taken out, 
the effect of the hidden risks which were spe-
cific to the forward market would, therefore, 
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be absorbed in the intercept, 1,γ  through the 
regressing process. As such, a lower value 
should be obtained from the intercept gener-
ated from equation (6), 1,γ  compared to that 
of the improved fsIt model, 1,β  outlined in 
equation (5), indicating the amount of wealth 
transferred from the presale property buyers 
to the developers. the test was carried out and 
the results are contained in table 3.
the results of the oLs estimates on the 
forward-spot pair sales only equation (6) com-
pared to that of the improved fsIt model 
equation (5) on the same set of properties 
are contained in table 3. the comparison 
showed that the coefficients attached to the 
explanatory variables of the spot market re-
turn (1.0018 in (6) vs 0.9903 in (5)), aging 
impact (–0.0195 in (6) vs –0.0158 in (5)) and 
discount required between the two tests dur-
ing the study period (1.0136 in (6) vs 0.9625 
in (5)) were very similar. however, the inter-
cept generated from the forward-spot pair-
sales only at –0.0208 in (6) was very much 
lower than that of the fsIt model at 0.0162 in 
(5), of which the impact of the hidden presale 
risks had been considered under a separate 
dummy variable. the range of the differences 
is –0.037 [from –0.0208 1(γ  in (6)) to 0.0162 
1(β  in (5))] which was approaching to 5β  of 
–0.04 in (5). The result once again confirmed 
the suggestion proposed by the improved fsIt 
model that presale property buyers had paid 
an extra amount of about 4% on the presale 
prices in the forward property market, higher 
than the expected prices required in the spot 
property market in which the group of hidden 
presale risks was not present.
5. CoNCLUSIoNS
the research was conducted to investigate 
whether a wealth transfer from presale prop-
erty buyers to developers had been imposed 
in the pricing of presale properties due to the 
hidden presale risks arising from asymmetric 
information in forward property markets. Ac-
cording to the economic theory of transfer of 
consumer surplus with asymmetric informa-
tion, developers are able to hide information 
about the negative aspects of the properties 
in the presales in order to generate an extra 
profit since buyers are not able to inspect the 
uncompleted properties when they make the 
purchases. by adapting the forward-spot index 
tracking (fsIt) model using a log-linear struc-
ture built by Leung et al. (2007b) for study-
ing the impact of the hidden presale risks on 
the pricing of presale properties, an improved 
fsIt model using a semi-log structure was 
built. The improved model can reflect more 
accurately the relationship between the price 
movement of presale properties and that of 
spot properties since logarithm had been taken 
on both variables for the measurement. 
table 3. comparison between forward-spot pair sales and improved fsIt model
Explanatory Variables
forward-spot pair sales only (6) the fsIt model (5)
Coefficient γ t-stat Coefficient β t-stat
constant –0.0208 –1.37 0.0162 0.12
spot market returns 1.0018 61.72 0.9903 0.00
discount factor 1.0136 5.18 0.9625 0.00
Aging –0.0195 –3.36 –0.0158 0.00
hidden forward risks N/A N/A –0.0405 0.01
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The results showed that, first, the market 
returns generated from presale properties in 
hong kong during the study period tracked 
along very closely to those of spot properties. 
second, a payment discount correlated to the 
interest rate at the time when the presale was 
transacted and the length of the construction 
time-lag was demanded on the presale price 
to compensate the additional cost of capi-
tal incurred to the buyer within the forward 
contract period. on the other hand, a wealth 
transfer averaging at about 4% of the presale 
prices was found in the pricing of the presale 
properties, which supports the proposition that 
developers could have charged prices in the 
presales higher than the prices of these prop-
erties sold in the spot market in which no hid-
den presale risks were present. on the other 
side, buyers might have to accept the higher 
price imposed on presales by developers in or-
der to get the developments with the housing 
attributes that they desired, which resulted 
in a wealth transfer. Yet, whether this was a 
premium that buyers were willing to pay for 
and, if so, how much the amount should be 
warrants further investigation. 
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SANtrAUkA
TURTO pERSKIRSTyMAS IšANKSTINIų NEKILNOJAMOJO TURTO SANDORIų RINKOSE 
barbara Y. p. LeUNg
Nekilnojamojo turto (NT) agento problema, kurią sukelia neproporcinga informacija iš anksto parduodant 
nebaigtą statyti nekilnojamąjį turtą išankstinių NT sandorių rinkose (angl. forward property markets), yra 
gerai žinoma. Kadangi pirkėjai negali apžiūrėti nebaigto statyti nekilnojamojo turto, vystytojai gali nuslėpti 
informaciją apie neigiamus nekilnojamojo turto dalykus arba perdėti kokybę, tuo siekdami pasipelnyti iš 
išankstinio pardavimo papildomai prie likutinės vertės, lyg nekilnojamasis turtas būtų parduodamas nea-
tidėliotinų atsiskaitymų rinkoje (angl. spot market). Šiuo atžvilgiu tyrime taikytas išankstiniais sandoriais 
ir neatidėliotinais atsiskaitymais pagrįsto kartotinio NT pardavimo kainodaros modelis, siekiant iš anksto 
parduodamo NT kainodarą išnagrinėti lyginant su neatidėliotinų atsiskaitymų rinkoje parduodamu NT, kai 
agento problemos nėra. Išvados rodo, kad vystytojai turėjo galimybę pirkėjams primesti turto perskirstymą 
paimdami iš jų daugiau, kai iš anksto parduodamą nekilnojamąjį turtą įkainodavo naudodamiesi nepropor-
cinga informacija, būdinga išankstinių NT sandorių rinkoms.
